Introduction
This article is part of an ongoing project in which the reproduction of 'race' and extended processes of racialisation are understood as integral to contemporary development. It seeks to 'research racial formations beyond ideology, through materiality, embodiment and spatiality' (Chari, 2008 (Chari, :1907 and emphasises in particular the importance of addressing questions of racialised and gendered embodiment in the context of global processes of accumulation. In this context, it examines the resurgence and reframing of population policy in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals. In particular, through an examination of a range of policy documents, it explores the role of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the largest private donor in international planning) and the British Government, joint organisers of the 2012 London Family Planning Summit and key drivers of the FP2020 'global family planning strategy'.
Population concerns are now routinely invoked in the context of neo-Malthusian discourses which relate migration, climate change and conflict. This article argues however that contemporary population policies represent more than a discursive smokescreen for the destructive impacts of global capital accumulation -they are in fact deeply enmeshed in strategies for its expansion. As such, they rely upon embodied coercion and violence which is racialised and gendered, even as they invoke narratives of reproductive rights and choices.
The article begins by critically engaging with recent work which identifies liberal universalism as the locus of continuity between eras of formal colonialism those of development, relating their relegation of 'race' exclusively to the former in these accounts to their neglect of the extractive and accumulative aspects of global capitalist processes taking place within the framework of 'development'. It then briefly traces the colonial and Cold War histories of population control policies, and the evolution of contemporary approaches which link climate change, conflict and migration to population growth. Through an analysis of the 2015 report of the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Population, Development and Reproductive Health, 'Population Dynamics and the Sustainable Development Goals (APPG, 2015) , it highlights how the renewed emphasis on population growth in the SDG era both draws upon and extends the differential and racialised valuation of lives, and provides legitimacy for a new phase of depredation by corporate capital. The second half of the article addresses in this context the role of the Gates Foundation with particular reference to the evolution of India's 'family planning' policies and practices, and explores the relationship between population policies and the intensification and extension of the racialied and gendered labour of women in the Global South as a strategy for global capital accumulation.
Race, Accumulation and Imperialism
Foucault's notion of biopower, in which populations are managed and regulated through technologies of surveillance and monitoring, has been a productive one for recent critical work on development. This understanding of biopower is predicated on a shift in the nature of power associated with the emergence of capitalism. Pre-existing 'sovereign' power defined as the power to 'let live or make die' is replaced by biopower which conversely seeks to 'make live' within a framework of far more intensive -while less visible -processes of intervention, regulation, surveillance and discipline which produce the 'docile bodies' and the subjectivities required for capitalist production. The Foucauldian approach has a number of aspects which have seemed to make it particularly appropriate for theorising development (and in particular its continuities with colonialism) -its emphasis on the regulation of populations through enumeration, categorisation and measurement; its conceptual focus on the discursive production of consent through 'processes of subjectivisation' rather than the coercive aspects of power; and its theorization of the co-constitutive relationship of power and knowledge. Foucault's ideas were incorporated extensively in the work of postcolonial theorists (most notably in Said's concept of Orientalism [1978] ) but a number of writers have commented on the absence of any explicit engagement with colonialism in Foucault's own work; and the apparent failure to recognize that the practices he describes were not merely adopted but originated and were perfected under conditions of colonial rule (Young [1995] ; see Stoler [1995] for a different reading of Foucault).
Mark Duffield (2005; , who has deployed a biopower framework extensively in his work on contemporary development and the emergence of the development/security nexus, highlights however, that Foucault drew a distinction between the biopolitics of 'mass society' in advanced capitalist/metropolitan social formations with various forms of state provision ensuring the reproduction of life, and that of populations in the global South which are 'non-insured' and expected to be self-reliant and self-reproducing (Duffield, 2005:145-6 ). 'Self-reproduction', Duffield argues, '…has long been axiomatic for people understood through the register of tradition, simplicity, backwardness and race ' (ibid:146) . Maintaining this self-reliance in order to both contain migration to the global North and to counter 'extremism' and other 'threats to international security' becomes a key objective of contemporary biopolitics (Duffield, 2006) . In this context, Duffield provides a powerful critique of discourses and practices of sustainable development which he sees as emerging from and structured by these objectives. He suggests that the rise of sustainable development as the dominant development paradigm marked a break with the 'aspirational goal' of modernization theory which claimed that living standards in the 'underdeveloped' world would eventually come to resemble those in the 'developed' countries (Duffield, 2005:152) . Instead, the strategy was now to promote self-reliance in the interests of containment. In a telling example, he cites an OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) report on 'terrorism prevention' which emphasises that 'education that spreads faster than jobs is potentially destabilizing since it heightens awareness of inequalities and hence breeds frustration' and that education and training imparted to young people as part of donor-funded programmes should be mindful of '…the feasibility of their aspirations' (DAC, 2003 cited in Duffield 2005 .
For Foucauldian theorists, both colonial strategies and contemporary development interventions have focused on managing populations and preventing or containing threats to security through making these populations self reliant. However, an analysis which excludes contemporary processes of extraction of natural resources, exploitation of labour, and expansion of markets by global capital leaves much unexplained. In the context of the discussion above, for example, it does not highlight that the shift from modernizing developmentalism to sustainable development as the key development paradigm was driven by the rise to dominance of neoliberalism as the strategy through which increasingly mobile global capital would sustain and expand accumulation. This neglect may be attributable to the adoption of Foucault's later conceptualization of power as circulating and all-pervasive, which militates against a focus on the class character or objectives of states or international development institutions, or the concentration of power in specific locations 1 . But it has significant implications. The recent trajectory of neoliberalism disrupts any clear-cut dichotomy between the 'insured' populations of the global North and the 'non-insured' and self-reproducing populations of the global South, through both the generalized dismantling of social provision in the countries of the global North and the proliferation of excluded spaces and populations within them. More importantly still, contemporary development interventions do not always 'promote life' or self-reproduction: on the contrary, they frequently fatally disrupt these processes, as for example in the case of corporate displacement of poor communities in India for the purposes of extracting minerals or turning agricultural land into real estate; or policies which allowed the withholding of treatment from people living with HIV in the global South in order to enhance the profits of pharmaceutical corporations; or the deaths in sterilisation camps or in drug tests which we consider below. Constructions of race which assign certain lives less value make these deaths allowable.
1 A similar point is made by Bracking and Harrison (2010:7) who point out that 'the increasing attention paid to networks (generated by theories of governance and their Foucauldian variants) opens a path to insightful research on global capitalism, but it also runs the peril of downplaying what is obvious to all observers: the persistent, and historically structured concentration of power emanating from the West'.(Italics in original) A significant strand of recent work has focused on liberal theory and practice as the locus of continuity between colonialism and development (see for example Williams and Young, 2009; Harris, 2013) . This produces some peculiar formulations and striking silences in relation to patterns of accumulation and constructions of race. For example, in a discussion of 'trusteeship and intervention' which aims to draw out parallels and continuities between colonial and contemporary forms of intervention for social transformation (with a focus on the World Bank) Williams and Young (2009) reduce the place of racism in the discourse of the civilizing mission to a 'racial gloss' which makes it 'repulsive to modern liberal ears' but is merely a distraction from the 'very strong assertions of the universality of human nature' on which the authors wish us to focus our attention(ibid:102). They go on to highlight the parallels between the 19 th century colonial civilizing mission and elite interventions in the lives of the poor in England in the same period, as evidence of this universalism. This ignores, firstly, the entire body of work which explains how evolving ideas about 'race' and racial superiority informed the pathologisation of the dispossessed poor in England (Magubane, 2004) . Secondly, it bypasses extensive scholarship on the way constructions of 'race', and specifically of 'whiteness' evolved over this period in the 19 th century, only gradually becoming inclusive of the metropolitan working class, and, later still, the Irish. Williams and Young, in contrast, seem to regard racial categories as fixed and ahistorical, and apply contemporary definitions of whiteness anachronistically, writing for example that 'a kind of practical historicism was by no means limited to exotic 'others' but informed thinking and practice about Ireland, Scotland and England itself' (ibid: 103) in reference to a period when the Irish, in particular, were clearly 'othered' in ways which were unmistakably racialised.
Inextricable it seems from the disavowal of the centrality of race in colonial processes is the minimizing of the processes of extraction and exploitation which shaped colonial interventions, in favour of an emphasis on the 'element of international tutelage' (ibid). The chapter rehearses the well-worn discursive strategy of minimising the extraction underpinning colonial regimes in general by citing the deviant 'exception' which supposedly proves the rule: the Belgian Congo.
'The notoriously brutal and really extractive (private) regime of Leopold II in the Congo' we are reminded 'was eventually terminated through pressure from the major powers ' (ibid: 103 The exclusive preoccupation with universalizing tendencies within interventionist projects thus seeks to minimize their role in reproducing and intensifying both inequality and difference across space. In particular, as we saw above, it delegitimises the question of how these inequalities are structured by, and articulated through, race. Thus colonial interventions in gendered practices deemed 'repugnant to civilisation' (such as sati in India, or polygamy)which have been the focus of an extensive postcolonial feminist critique (see for example Abu Lughod, 2002; Mani, 1987; Spivak, 1988) , are here simply cited as an inevitable result of 'a commitment to some notions of development which clearly tracked metropolitan norms (wage labour, housing, welfare and family structures, education)' (Williams and Young, 2009: 104) 2 . With race -as well as genderapparently considered irrelevant even in the colonial context, it is hardly surprising that the racialisation of the contemporary 'liberal project in Africa' and its production of 'the right kind of individual' (ibid.: 113) is nowhere to be seen in this account. Yet as I discuss below, the production of hyperindustrious neoliberal entrepreneurial subjects, in part through population policies which seek to control the fertility of women in the global South, is inextricable from processes of gendering and racialisation. And the adoption of the discourse of reproductive rights to promote these policies has unmistakable continuities with colonial interventions which made claims to 'save brown women from brown men' (Spivak, 1988) .
I am by no means suggesting here that liberalism and universalist discourses should not be a central element in an analysis of imperialism -whether in its historical or contemporary manifestations. The shift in the approach of 19 th century liberal thought to the imperial project has been extensively analysed (see for example Mehta, 1999; Pitts, 2006) . In a more general sense, the key liberal concept of human progress has underpinned both colonial and development projects. Rather, I am concerned to highlight the silences and elisions which are produced when liberalism is considered in isolation from two other questions -those of race and capital. These three questions, I would argue, have been and remain mutually constitutive. The relationships between the development of enlightenment liberal universalism, the consolidation of concepts of race, and the emergence of capitalism out of slavery and colonialism, have been traced and theorized in depth elsewhere. I suggest that any project which seeks to explore the facets of contemporary development-as-imperialism must also consider these three questions in relation to eachother.
The focus on liberal notions of social engineering as the main axis of comparison between colonialism and development also seems to frequently be associated with two assumptions: 'endlessly obscured the degree to which colonial rule was committed to projects of social change that were never reducible to oppression and exploitation ' (William and Young, 2014:34) .
Even more importantly for our current discussion, coercion is assumed to be marginal in contemporary development processes, to be, in fact, the grounds on which any comparison between colonialism and development must inevitably falter. A broad conceptualization of development encompasses the visceral corporate-and state-sponsored violence accompanying contemporary resource extraction and accumulation by dispossession -from the bauxite mountains of Odisha in India to the oilfields of the Niger Delta. But even if we accept a narrower understanding of development, one which is limited to government aid departments, NGOs and international financial institutions, the structural violence of coercively imposed neo-liberal economic policies seems difficult to ignore. The market fundamentalism and racialised disregard for human life of colonial administrations, which fuelled the El Nino famines of the nineteenth century, echo in the early twenty-first century's policy driven famines and epidemics brought on by the dictates of the IMF.
I suggest that the neglect of the specificities of accumulation processes and the inequalities they build upon and reproduce, and of how these are experienced in ways which are material and embodied, actually makes it easier to marginalize questions of racism and racialised relations of power, and to view them as no longer relevant. Since race is understood solely as a discursive strategy of power in the critiques of the development/security paradigm, its apparent absence from development discourse 3 appears to render race unworthy of serious consideration in the context of development. As race is rarely explicitly cited as a justification for subordination, or for the treatment of certain groups of people as less than human, it is assumed to be marginal to the contemporary operations of power. In what follows, I consider the implications of recentering 'race' -understood here as always already gendered -for a consideration of contemporary global population policy. In order to do this we need to briefly consider the history of such policies.
Population Policy in Historical Perspective
Historically population policies can be understood as an ongoing racialised project of capital, informed by the closely intertwined ideologies of Eugenics and neo-Malthusianism (Wilson, 2012) . While Thomas Malthus' name has become synonymous with theories of 'overpopulation', his primary legacy has been to provide 'an enduring argument for the prevention of social and economic change' (Ross, 1998:6) 'every benevolent attempt made to mitigate the effects of famine and defective sanitation serves but to enhance the evils resulting from overpopulation'(cited in Davis, 2001: 32) . Sir Richard
Temple, appointed by Lytton to ensure that India continued to produce immense revenues for
Britain and its imperial war in Afghanistan even at the height of the famine, implemented the notorious 'Temple wage' in relief camps which combined with hard labour could only lead to slow death by starvation.
In the first half of the 20 th century, with the rise of anti-colonial struggles, populations came to be constructed as a racialised threat. Whereas earlier they were described in terms of 'apathy', 'indolence' and 'fatalism', tropes which were used to justify colonial inaction in the face of famine and starvation, these same populations now began to be more often portrayed as ominously hyperactive, incessantly 'swarming', 'teeming' and 'seething' (Wilson, 2012) . These ideas would soon be mobilized to call for direct intervention to limit these populations, in the context of the Cold War, the reconfiguring of imperialism after formal colonialism, and the challenge to the existing global distribution of wealth and resources posed by communist movements in the global South.
The constitution of population control as a Cold War political and economic weapon is reflected in the transformation in the field of demography described by Mohan Rao -a primarily descriptive social science discipline dedicated to observing long-term historical changes in population patterns rapidly came to be viewed in the 1950s as a technical, policy oriented 'science' (Rao, 1994: PE47) . The idea of a demographic transition was rejected on the basis that 'rapid modernization might not lead to fertility decline before it led to a threatening level of social and political instability' (Ross, 1998:92 World countries might 'advocate a better distribution of the world's wealth'; thirdly that 'in the absence of slow or zero population growth, concessions to foreign companies are likely to be expropriated or subject to arbitrary intervention. Whether through government action, labour conflicts, sabotage, civil disturbance, the smooth flow of needed materials will be jeopardised.'
(cited in Wilson,1994 Wilson, : 2201 While Nations, 1987) . While the need for improvemenents in women's access to health services and education was highlighted in the report, this was seen primarily as a means to reduce population growth, and as Hartmann, Hendrixson and Sasser note, was in any case 'secondary to an emergency prerogative to drive down birth rates. "But time is short", it warns, "and developing countries will also have to promote direct measures to reduce fertility, to avoid going radically beyond the productive potential to support their populations"' (Hartmann, Hendrixson, and Sasser, 2016: 60) .
In the era of the Sustainable Development Goals, this approach has been extended and deepened, and population discourse revolves around the notion of population growth as a driver of climate change (or more recently, as at the very least an obstacle to its mitigation), with the anticipated 'threats' being increases in conflict, terrorism, and crucially, migration from the global South the global North. As Duffield and Evans (2011, p.95) note, climate change is now seen as a key threat to the containment of the global South '…a truism of 21st Century security discourse and practice is that the spatial dimensions of the development-security nexus cannot be achieved without an adaptive environmental sustainability'.
Climate change, conflict and migration within contemporary population discourse In these readings of both the present and the projected future, the role of imperialist economic, geo-political and military interventions, the ongoing transfer of wealth to the global North (particularly from Africa) and increased corporate control over land and resources (Curtis, 2016) are all rendered invisible, as are the specificities of particular places and times, in favour of population growth rates and demographic structure. Thus the APPG report focuses on 'high fertility' as a cause of conflict arguing that 'There is significant overlap between countries with high fertility and those that are considered to be "fragile" states . Office of Global Issues, formal "youth bulge" theory originally aimed to provide …a tool to predict unrest and uncover potential national security threats…It equates large percentages of young men with an increased possibility of violence, particularly in the South, where, analysts argue, governments may not have the capacity to support them' (Hendrixson, 2004 ) Today, it is often juxtaposed with the more optimistic notion of a 'demographic dividend' which however can be achieved only if countries with young populations can prevent future population the 'angry young men' it produces and the 'veiled young women' who in the future will produce yet more 'dangerous' children (Hendrixson, 2004) .
The APPG report for example displays such confidence in the explanatory power of the 'youth bulge' hypothesis that it goes on to cite a difference of 5 years in the average age of the population as sufficient to account for differences in the very diverse contexts of Tunisia and Egypt: 'Recent "uprisings" in the Arab Spring are an example. Tunisia, with an average age of 31 years has (so far successfully) transitioned into a liberal democracy. Egypt, with an average age of 26 years, has not' (APPG, 2015, p.24). Disembodied statistics thinly mask the invocation of racialised and gendered bodies.
The renewed emphasis on population growth as a threat, this time in the context of sustainable development narratives, thus serves to displace and derail the possibilities for a more transformative agenda around sustainability to emerge from debates aroung the SDGs and the opportunity identified by Death and Gabay (2015) to 'contest and destabilise' the 'growthorientated development model of intensive resource extraction' (op. cit., p.602). It is notable that influential critiques of these models which have emerged in the context of debates around the SDGs, for example Tim Jackson's 'Prosperity Without Growth' reiterate ideas about the need to 'stabilise' populations (Jackson, 2009, p.80) without engaging with what this would mean in practice, and for whom (a question which is explored in the second half of this article). As a result, these approaches have arguably not effectively countered those which promote population control as the 'answer' to a crisis of sustainability.
At the same time, and relatedly, population discourse in the context of the SDGs reinscribes and reinforces rather than challenging the distinction between the developing world which was the focus of the MDGs and more broadly is the perennial object of development interventions, and the 'developed' world, whose security is to be safeguarded by these interventions. If a range of conflicts from Darfur to Syria are reframed as 'climate wars' caused primarily by growing populations and scarce resources (Hartmann and Selby, 2015) much of this discourse focuses on growth leading a greater percentage of people of working age in relation to elderly people and children (Hartmann, Hendrixson and Sasser, 2016) .
migration from the global South as a threat to security in the North. As the APPG report puts it 'it is highly likely that the second half of the 21st century will see unprecedented levels of migration, including hundreds of millions of migrants fleeing climate change, and at the time of writing there is already a growing crisis of refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean from Africa to Europe'. This combines the prediction of a dystopian future with an invocation of fears about the present ('already a growing crisis'). Despite the preoccupation with numbers in population discourses, the 'migrants and refugees' in these constructions are clearly far from disembodied statistics, but rather are racialised and gendered bodies who are by definition excludable: both through the policing of national borders, and by extension through the policing of the borders of the category 'human' itself, to which these discourses contribute. This is emphasised by the striking use of photographic illustrations in the APPG report which appear designed to highlight this underlying projection of racialised apocalypse and undermine some of its caveats (such as the acknowledgment that consumption in the global North is the major driver of climate change (APPG, 2015,p.15) or of the potential gains from supporting migrants' rights (op. cit., pp.19-20) .
Representations of the global South are now replete with representations of women and adolescent girls as potential hyperindustrious, entrepreneurial neoliberal subjects (Wilson, 2015) ; in a new version of the 'deserving and undeserving poor' dichotomy, men in the global South are assumed to be irresponsible, unproductive, and potentially threatening to the global order, in a reiteration of racialised and gendered colonial representations.
As is perhaps then to be expected in a publication which places more emphasis on the apocalyptic side of the population control argument than on its correlate, the celebration of the integration of women's labour into global markets which population control is expected to facilitate, the pages of the report are strewn with images of black and brown men in which they are represented as a threat, both in terms of sheer numbers and through association with conflict and violence.
The vast majority of the photographs used to illustrate the report portray groups of people in (or from) the global South -of ten such photographs, seven are exclusively of men, while only two exclusively portray women and one is of a mixed gender family group. Only one of the all-male groups -'two boys rest on sandbags…along the river Jamuna..Bangladesh' (APPG, 2015, p.18 Most prominent and most disturbing however are the two photographs which bookend the report.
The first, the report's cover photograph, shows around approximately fifty African men sitting in a small wooden vessel at sea -the photograph has been taken from above and the men are pictured looking up squinting against the sunshine with anxious, uncertain and expectant
expressions. This photograph is titled 'Would-be immigrants are pictured in a dinghy after being rescued in the sea near Italy's southern island of Lampedusa on August 28, 2008. Seventy would-be illegal African immigrants to Europe perished when their boat sank in the
Mediterranean Sea, according to eight companions rescued off Malta' (APPG, 2015, cover) . The racialised dehumanization which allows human beings to be described as 'would-be illegal African immigrants' is shockingly intensified in the closing image, which appears before the report's conclusions. This photograph shows a beach with the dead bodies of twelve people lying in the surf and on the sand where they have been washed to shore. Three of them are in the foreground; they appear to have been disfigured by being in the water. In the middle distance, figures in masks, some in orange overalls, can be seen picking up bodies. This horrific photograph has a caption which repeats the term 'illegal immigrants/migrants' no less than three (APPG, 2015:38) .
The notion of the disposability of racialised bodies under capitalist globalization, and its continuities with colonial depredations reaching back to the transatlantic slave trade could not be more starkly -and more uncritically -illustrated than by this juxtaposition of image and text.
As this suggests then, rather than countering the developed/developing world dichotomy, the renewed emphasis on population growth in the SDG era actually reinforces the differential and racialised valuation of lives, those which are 'grievable' and those which are defined as 'ungrievable' -which has characterised development from the outset and provides legitimacy for a new phase of depredation by corporate capital.
In the following sections, I argue that contemporary population policies represent more than a discursive smokescreen for the destructive impacts of global capital accumulation -they are in fact deeply enmeshed in strategies for its expansion. As such, they rely upon embodied coercion and violence which is racialised and gendered, even as they invoke narratives of reproductive rights and choices. In this context I consider in particular the role of the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation, which has emerged as a key advocate of contemporary population initiatives, with a focus on its impact on population policy and practice in India.
The Gates Foundation, FP2020 and India's 'Family Planning' programme which have faced sustained opposition from reproductive health activists, who argue that rather than giving poor women in the global South much needed access to safe contraception they can control, these approaches potentially further undermine women's health and control over their bodies (Kafila, 2015; Subramaniam et al, 2016 AVAC, 2016 .
As a recent report notes, the Gates Foundation is now one of the most powerful actors in global development (Global Justice Now, 2016) , as well as one of the least accountable (Harman, 2016) . Population growth has been a key concern of the Gates Foundation, which was instrumental in influencing Britain to take the lead on population issues (J.P., 2012). As well as its central role in the 2012 Family Planning Summit and FP2020, it extensively funds research and scholarship which supports its approach to family planning. Hendrixson (forthcoming 2018) explains how the discourse of the Gates Foundation, FP2020 and the World Health Organisation continues to reproduce neo-Malthusian ideas by repeatedly linking family planning to 'environmental stewardship', 'sustainable development' and 'long-term environmental sustainability', underlining the inherent tension between a stated commitment to 'voluntary' family planning and its instrumentalisation for specific policy goals, which creates the conditions for coercive interventions.
Further, and in common with the earlier versions we have traced here, today's population discourse insists that existing economic relationships and structures of power do not need to be changed. In particular, it is not predicated on any reversal of the drastic reduction in health an increase in the payment given to all those involved in carrying out sterilization in these states (Singh, 2014) . Meanwhile, aid from Britain's Department for International Development (DfID) was found to have helped to fund forcible sterilizations in the Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Bihar in which a number of women died in 2012 (Chamberlain, 2012) .
Both sterilisation campaigns and promotion of long acting hormonal contraceptives are taking place in the context of further withdrawal of health provision (Schultz and Bendix, 2015) . This is also consistent with a wider trend which has been associated with the growing dominance of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in global health policy: the prioritization of 'vertical' interventions over 'horizontal' investment in health systems. As Harman observes, this 'has been seen to lead to underfunding and a lack of attention to the horizontal health systems-for example, procurement chains, referral systems, clinician training, and health center management-that sustain such interventions and provide the basis of health care' (Harman, 2016:355-6) In India, the increased pressure of meeting FP2020 commitments has been accompanied by the further undermining of already inadequate health provision since the current government of Narendra Modi's Hindu right Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in 2014, as a major study by Indian health experts published in the Lancet has highlighted (Patel et al, 2015) .
Injectable and implantable contraceptives are specifically being promoted as suitable for use in the context of this absence of health provision, as they are presented as simple enough to be administered by minimally trained health workers -often unpaid women. DfID's recent initiative with Merck has aimed to promote the longlasting implant Implanon to "14.5 million of the poorest women" by 2015. Implanon was discontinued in the UK in 2010 because trained medical personnel were finding it too difficult to insert, and there were fears about its safety(BBC, 2011). As well as debilitating side effects, the implant was reported as "disappearing" inside women's bodies (MHRA, 2011) . Merck has introduced a new version, Nexplanon, which is detectable by X-ray, but has been allowed to continue to sell their existing stocks of Implanon. It is this discontinued drug which is being promoted in DfID and UNFPA programmes in the "poorest" countries, despite these countries' huge deficit of trained health personnel. In fact, in Ethiopia, one of the target countries, mass insertions of Implanon are part of "task shifting" where hastily trained health extension workers are being made to take on the roles of doctors and nurses. remains incapable of dealing with the safe delivery of a contraceptive requiring intensive medical support '(Kafila, 2015; Sarojini and Nandy, 2015) .
Government approval for Depo Provera has been argued to have spurred on by the recent attention focused on the use of sterilizations in Indian government programmes, particularly after multiple deaths of women in Chhattisgarh (Barry and Dugger, 2016 ). Yet, as observers note, there is no indication that the newly introduced contraceptives will lead to a phasing out of these 'camps' in India, which continue to take place regularly(op.cit.) and which have been largely outsourced to the private sector.
'Smart Economics', population policy and the intensification of women's labour
The renewed emphasis on fertility reduction is not only geared towards shifting attention away from global capital's responsibility for poverty, climate change and food crises. Nor is it only oriented towards increasing profits in the pharmaceutical industry. Central to the strategy of which the return of population control is a part, is the intensification of women's labour, with responsibility for household survival increasingly feminised, and more and more women incorporated into global value chains dominated by transnational corporations. It is this drive to intensify and incorporate the labour of women in poor households in the global South, as I have discussed in detail elsewhere (Wilson, 2015 and forthcoming) , rather than feminist concerns about reproductive and sexual rights, which underpins the now ubiquitous slogan of 'investing in women'. The last two decades have seen a growing emphasis on the extension and intensification of women's labour as central to sustaining neoliberal capital accumulation. As in Puerto Rico in the 1950s, where coercive mass sterilization drives were pioneered as part of one of the earliest experiments in increasing profits by outsourcing manufacturing to low-paid women workers in the global South in 'Operation Bootstrap' (Briggs, 2002; Mass, 1977) , a reduction in women's fertility is being promoted primarily as it is regarded as facilitating women's entry into labour markets and enhancing their productivity for global capital. For example the World Bank's report on 'Investing in Women's Reproductive Health', begins by explaining why 'investing in reproductive health is smart economics', noting the effects of 'high fertility' on 'female labour supply ' Grépin and Klugman (2013) .
'Smart economics' is the approach to gender currently promoted by globally dominant development institutions, epitomized by the World Bank's slogan 'Gender Equality as Smart Economics' (World Bank, 2006; and the current corporate-initiated global development focus on adolescent girls which constructs the potential productivity of 'girls' as the key to accelerated growth. Smart Economics is premised on the assumption that women will always work harder, and be more productive, than their male counterparts; further, they will use additional income more productively and altruistically than men would. Therefore it argues that greater gender 'equality', understood as an increase in women's participation in labour markets, will have a significant impact on economic growth.
While using the language of gender equality, the Smart Economics approach, as should be evident, in fact relies heavily on the perpetuation of gendered ideologies and gendered material compulsions to produce its ideal altruistic entrepreneurial subject, who will continue to fulfil gendered reproductive duties while producing for global capital under ever more precarious conditions (Wilson, 2015) . It is also embedded in a racialised postcolonial hierarchy in which economic policies can be built on the assumption that 'poor women in the global South' have a capacity for labour which is almost infinitely elastic.
In 21 st century sustainable development discourse then, these women and adolescent girls are simultaneously understood as disposable labouring bodies and as dangerous reproductive bodies marked by 'excessive' fertility, and as we have seen, can therefore be subject to coercive sterilizations, and testing and dumping of hormonal contraceptives. Conversely, men and adolescent boys from the same communities are represented in racialised terms as unproductive and extraneous to processes of global capital accumulation and as embodying violence, conflict, and terrorism. These interdependent gendered and racialised tropes are used to subject men, women and children who seek to migrate to the global North to the embodied violence of borders, and to once again reconstitute their lives as ungrievable.
Conclusion
This article has suggested that a critical engagement with population discourse, policy and practice in the era of the Sustainable Development Goals requires a recognition of the centrality of race and racialisation, understood in gendered, material and embodied as well as discursive terms and as inseparable from contemporary processes of global capital accumulation. More generally I argue that this 're-centering' of race is essential if the dominant approaches to sustainable development, which are effectively structured around the production and extension of difference, inequality, exclusion and exploitation, are to be effectively challenged.
